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ARTICLE
MAKING GOOD LAWYERS
ELI WALD* & RUSSELL G. PEARCE**
INTRODUCTION
  Critiques of legal education abound.1 Law schools have long been
charged with failing to effectively prepare students for the practice of law,2
being too theoretical and too detached from the profession,3 and offering a
dehumanizing and alienating educational experience.4 More recently, legal
* Charles W. Delaney, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
We thank for their valuable comments the participants in the University of St. Thomas Law Jour-
nal symposium on The Lawyer’s Role and Professional Formation, as well as Steven Bennett,
Dick Bourne, Neil Hamilton, Larry Krieger, Brent Newton, Deborah Rhode, David Thomson, and
Ian Weinstein.
** Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Cross-
roads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 (2011); Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms
of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2012), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1994189. The recent cycle of critiques has
included a proliferation of blogs dedicated to studying legal education. See, e.g., NAT’L L.J. L.
SCH. REV., http://legaltimes.typepad.com/lawschoolreview/ (Nov. 10, 2011); William D. Hender-
son, What Is the Legal Whiteboard?, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Jan. 22, 2012), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/week4/index.html (“According to a lot of reputable media out-
lets, the sky is falling for both legal education and legal services.”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAIL-
ING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
2. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARING FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW 21–46 (2007) [hereinafter: CARNEGIE REPORT]; ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 11–36 (2007) [hereinafter CLEA REPORT];
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 1–112 (Robert MacCrate ed., stu-
dent ed. 1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
3. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Chief Justice Roberts has recently joined the
critics. See Jonathan H. Adler, Chief Justice Roberts and Current Legal Scholarship, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (July 23, 2011, 11:07 a.m.), http://volokh.com/2011/07/23/chief-justice-roberts-and-
current-legal-scholarship/; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, The Costs of Legal Scholarship: $575M
in Tuition and Grads Who Don’t Know How to Practice, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 21, 2011, 7:53 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/why_new_lawyers_dont_know_how_to_practice_law/.
4. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Humanizing Legal Education: An Introduction to a Sympo-
sium Whose Time Came, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 235–42 (2008); Susan L. Brooks, Meeting the
Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a Relationship-Centered Experien-
tial Curriculum, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 395 (2012); see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy,
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education has been condemned as too expensive and as offering a product
that is declining in value.5 Moreover, law schools have been disparaged for
failing to help students develop a sense of professional identity, profes-
sional values, and professionalism.6
Law schools, in turn, have been largely unresponsive to challenges.7 In
significant ways, twenty-first century legal education looks a lot like it did
in the late nineteenth century.8 Some contemporary critics, however, be-
lieve that transformative changes will now occur because law schools face
overwhelming pressures to reform, ranging from the high cost of legal edu-
cation, concerns regarding whether law graduates receive the training they
need to become competent practitioners, and the tough job prospects law
graduates encounter.9
Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 871, 873 (1999); Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law
School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 112, 127–29 (2002); Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Per-
sonal Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425,
425–35 (2005); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects
of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory, 33 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883, 883–86 (2007); JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO,
HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS 62–64 (2005).
That is not to deny the existence of additional challenges, for example, that law schools are
liberal bastions that unduly influence, even manipulate, American law, see WALTER OLSON,
SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN OVERLAWYERED AMERICA 1–31 (2011), and
that law schools mistreat, even discriminate against some of their students, see LANI GUINIER ET
AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
5. Richard W. Bourne, The Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and
Where We Go Now, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651 (2012); Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law
Degree a Good Investment Today? 23 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 11-42, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1957139;
Steven C. Bennett, When Will Law School Change?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 87, 89–94 (2010); see also
David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at BU1.
6. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 21–46. These critiques, it should be noted, are not R
new. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 343 (1933); Warren E. Burger, The
Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 949, 954 (1995); see also AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE: TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM
§ 1(B) (1996) (discussing the decline in professionalism and increased incivility); Sandra Day
O’Connor, Professionalism, WYO. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 12, 13 (noting the “growing incivility”
among lawyers).
7. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a
Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 519 (2007).
8. See Robert W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 339, 341 (2007) (describing the early Harvard approach as one that involved difficult tests,
required courses in the first and second year, and preconditioned admission on a college degree).
9. Henderson, supra note 1 (“I am not in the sky-is-falling camp. Instead, I see a lot of
opportunities for lawyers, law students, and legal educators to do very important and creative
work.”); Martin J. Katz, Practice-Ready: The False Dichotomy Between Theory and Practice,
EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW. (Dec. 13, 2011), http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/blog/
detail/practice-ready-the-false-dichotomy-between-theory-and-practice; Erwin Chemerinsky, Le-
gal Education Must Change, But Will It?, NAT’L L.J. L. SCH. REV. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://legal
times.typepad.com/lawschoolreview/2011/11/your-best-friend-calls-you-and-tells-you-heshes-re-
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While significant changes may loom on the horizon, such as a two year
J.D. degree, a growing emphasis on experiential learning, or undergraduate
legal education,10 law schools continue to reject proposals for new and
meaningful steps toward helping students form professional identities and
values. Legal educators have responded that “values cannot be taught to
formed adult law students;”11 that in a pluralist society values should not be
preached;12 and that even if values can and should be taught, law schools
have no particular expertise in teaching them.13
Our contention is that notwithstanding their denial, law schools have
been implicitly yet actively engaged in the formation of students’ profes-
sional identities. Specifically, law schools have been instilling a very partic-
ular brand of professional identity, forming students into autonomously
self-interested lawyers.14 Such attorneys understand their professional role
to be the aggressive pursuit of their clients’ interests with little regard to the
interests of others, the law itself, or the public; perceive their role as a rep-
resentative of clients to dominate and supersede their roles as an officer of
the legal system and as a public citizen; and believe that their duties to the
public interest and to public service are fulfilled by their representation of
private client interests such that they have no other responsibility to further
the rule of law and access to justice.
Moreover, this active formation of law students’ professional identity
and professional values reflects the dominant autonomously self-interested
culture of law schools and the legal profession. Therefore, even if law
schools were devoted to forming professional identity outside of the mold
of autonomous self-interest, which many are not, such a commitment would
ally-sick-how-do-you-show-you-care.html; Educator’s Debate: Are Law Schools in Crisis?,
NAT’L L.J., Nov. 7, 2011, at S4–S12.
10. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Russell D. Mangas, First Things We Do, Let’s Kill All the
Law Schools, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2012, at A15. The literature on experiential teaching and
learning is vast. See, e.g., Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522–23 (1995); Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and
Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC.
51 (2001); Nantiya Ruan, Experiential Learning in the First-Year Curriculum: The Public-Interest
Partnership, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 191 (2011).
11. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 133; see Neil W. Hamilton & Verna Monson, Ethical R
Professional (Trans)Formation: Themes from Interviews About Professionalism with Exemplary
Lawyers, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 921 (2012); Verna E. Monson & Neil W. Hamilton, Ethical
Professional (Trans)Formation: Early Career Lawyers Make Sense of Professionalism, 8 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 129, 159–60 (2011) (concluding that values are developed over a lifetime); see also
Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law
School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 733–35 (1998); Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of
Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 325–32 (1982).
12. W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 711, 726–27 (2002).
13. Id. at 713; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 132–33; Carole Silver et al., R
Unpacking the Apprenticeship of Professional Identity and Purpose: Insights from the Law School
Survey of Student Engagement, 17 LEGAL WRITING 373, 376–77 (2011).
14. See infra Part II.
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require much more than curricular reform. It would require challenging the
dominant professional culture of autonomous self-interest and developing
alternatives to it that in time will inform and shape different professional
identities.15 Given the dominance of autonomous self-interest in legal edu-
cation, the legal profession, and American culture, the task is monumental,
but one thing is clear: reform proposals that advocate the formation of pro-
fessional identity without recognizing that law schools are already engaged
in such a formation project, as well as plans to revise legal education that
underestimate the power and influence of the culture of autonomous self-
interest, are bound to fail.16
Part I of this article defines the often confused and misunderstood no-
tions of professionalism and professional identity. That law schools and law
professors are frequently baffled by the ideas of professionalism and profes-
15. On the need to challenge the dominant culture of law schools as a condition for the
success of any particular reform, see Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School
Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978) [hereinafter Cramton, Ordinary Religion]; Roger C.
Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987); Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 7, at 519 (“[H]istory is littered with failed reform efforts of this type. Many brilliant reforms R
do not take root because they overlook the crucial role of law school culture in determining their
meaning and impact.”); Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 1271, 1273 (1994).
16. In a thoughtful article, Steven Bennett argues that law schools are likely to implement
reform only when forced to do so by demand in the market for legal education. Bennett, supra
note 5, at 107–27; see also William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bub- R
ble, 98 A.B.A. J. 30 (2012). We doubt law schools are likely to face such demand-side pressures,
either from students or from the practicing bar. The market for legal education is not a competitive
market meaning that even if law schools wanted to reform their ability to do so would be some-
what limited by existing ABA accreditation standards, although it should be noted that the ABA
has been contemplating reform of its own standards to conform to the Carnegie Report recommen-
dation. See Neil W. Hamilton, Analyzing Common Themes in Legal Scholarship on Professional-
ism 1–5 (Univ. St. Thomas Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
11-24, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917058.
More importantly, current and prospective law students lack any meaningful bargaining
power vis-a`-vis law schools, notwithstanding a recent slew of lawsuits by students accusing law
schools of fraud and misrepresentation of employment statistics. See Martha Neil, 12 More Law
Schools Sued over Reporting of Law Grad Employment and Salary Stats, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/12_more_law_schools_sued_in_consumer-fraud_class_
action_re_reported_law/. Indeed, Henderson & Zahorsky’s own statistics suggest that the “law
school bubble” is not about to pop: preliminary LSAC returns show that nearly 80,000 have
applied for law school admission in 2012, competing for 60,000 spots at ABA-approved law
schools, evidencing significant over-demand for legal education. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra, at
32.
Similarly, law firms also likely lack the ability to influence law schools, and it is doubtful
that they have a uniform agenda they could agree on, even if they did have the power to force
changes in legal education. Robert Stevens, for example, has documented the symbiotic relation-
ship between elite law firms and elite law schools, a relationship that casts a doubt as to the desire
of elite law firms to change the status quo in legal education. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 51 (1983); JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 28–30
(1977) (describing the symbiotic relationship between elite law schools and elite corporate law
firms, matching the so-called “best” law students with the “best” law firms); see also Dennis
Curtis, Can Law Schools and Big Law Firms be Friends?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (2000).
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sional identity is not surprising: the subjects hardly ever come up explicitly.
Most law professors have not encountered them systematically themselves
while they were in law school; have not practiced long enough (if at all) to
experience them in practice; and do not research, write, or teach them.
Rather, law professors are assumed to have mastered the ability to form
professional identity by virtue of becoming non-practicing academic law-
yers. Accordingly, they nod ambiguously on the rare occasions when the
topics of professional identity and professionalism arise and continue to
think of them (if they do) as part of an amorphous black box of values,
commitments, and skills. Part I offers workable definitions of professional-
ism and professional identity that will enable an informed discussion of the
formation of professional identity in and by law schools. Our proposed defi-
nitions of professionalism and professional identity build on a distinction
we have introduced and developed elsewhere between autonomously self-
interested and relationally self-interested accounts of lawyering.17
Part II explores what and how legal education teaches students, dem-
onstrating that contrary to common wisdom both institutionally (at the law
school level) and individually (at the law professor level), legal education is
proactively engaged in the formation of professional identity. Moreover,
legal education forms a particular professional identity of autonomous self-
interest, which is grounded in and reflects the culture of autonomous self-
interest prevalent in law schools and in the profession.
Its dominance in legal education notwithstanding, autonomous self-in-
terest is but one, often unpersuasive, account of professionalism and profes-
sional identity. Part III turns to the competing vision of relationally self-
interested professionalism and professional identity and develops an outline
for legal education grounded in this conception. Because legal education
reflects a deep commitment to the dominant culture of autonomous self-
interest, we think it unlikely that reform proposals that are inconsistent with
that culture are likely to succeed in the near future. Yet exposing the domi-
nant culture and the professional identity it fosters is a necessary step to-
ward providing a workable framework for reformers committed to
promoting professional values in the long term.
I. PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
A. A Brief Introduction to Professionalism
With some wariness we venture into the sticky waters of defining pro-
fessionalism, bearing in mind Monroe Freedman’s admonition that when
17. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Con-
fronting the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 25–39
(2011).
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surrounded by platitudes about professionalism, one is tempted to join the
call for a “Professionalism Non-proliferation Treaty.”18
Although commentators have offered varied descriptions of profes-
sionalism, these definitions possess three common elements: inaccessible
expertise, altruistic commitment to the public good, and autonomy.19 For
example, Wasserstrom’s well-known description of a profession lists the
acquisition of formal education, mastery and exercise of intellectual ability,
possession of a monopoly over the provision of services coupled with self-
regulation, attainment of social prestige and material affluence, representa-
tion of vulnerable clients, involvement in interpersonal relationships with
clients, and adherence to a role-morality.20  Roscoe Pound propounded the
classic definition of a profession as a “group . . . pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service—no less a public service
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned
art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.”21 The American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct’s definition of a law-
yer as a “representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a pub-
lic citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice”22 builds
on these notions by recognizing the representation of paying clients as legit-
imate while making lawyers responsible for public service by deeming
them officers of the legal system and public citizens who owe a duty to the
quality of justice.23
Critics from the left and right have challenged the meaning and pur-
pose of professionalism, arguing that the attainment of social prestige and
material affluence is the true purpose of professionals and that they do so by
successfully lobbying for a monopoly over the provision of services, which
they in turn justify by claiming to possess esoteric knowledge and acting to
18. Monroe Freedman, A Brief; Points of View; Opinion and Commentary; Cases and Con-
troversy, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at 22; Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibili-
ties of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 24 (1999) (citing Freedman, supra, at 22). For
a recent survey of professionalism literature, see Hamilton, supra note 16; and Neil W. Hamilton, R
Fostering Professional Formation (Professionalism): Lessons from the Carnegie Foundation’s
Five Studies on Educating Professionals, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763 (2012).
19. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1238–40
(1995).
20. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 1, 2
n.1. (1975).
21. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011).
23. In Wasserstrom’s terms, the representation of clients’ private interests for pay while exer-
cising a monopoly over the provision of legal services will lend lawyers social prestige and mate-
rial affluence and will in turn impose on them duties to follow a role morality codified in rules of
professional conduct, which include a commitment to pursue justice and the public interest. Was-
serstrom, supra note 20, at 16–19, 23. R
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serve the public good, and not their own interests.24 We leave to another
day debates over the “true” meaning and desirability of professionalism.25
For our purposes, suffice it to say that either as a constitutive feature of
their professional identity or as an instrumental imperative to retain their
professional status, lawyers must prove that the practice of law is in the
public interest and is in the spirit of public service.26
This, in turn, allows us to frame the narrow question of professional-
ism to be addressed in this article as follows: assuming that the core of
professionalism (inherently or instrumentally) entails a duty to practice in
the spirit of public service, what are the contours of such a duty?
Historically, the profession offered a two-part answer. With regard to
the representation of paying clients, the public spirit of law practice meant
that lawyers were under a duty to provide high quality legal services to
presumably vulnerable and unsophisticated clients and to include in client
counseling consideration of the spirit of the law and the public good.27 This
the profession purportedly achieved by promulgating and enforcing rules of
professional conduct.28 Next, the spirit of public service meant that in addi-
24. From the left, see MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977) and RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989). From the right, Richard
Posner has argued that lawyers’ professionalism amounts to little more than a mystique means to
elevate the status and pocketbook of lawyers at the expense of clients and competitors. RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 185–211 (1999); see also David
Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1001, 1002 (1996); Eli Wald, An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: Law and Economics
in Defense of Professional Ideals, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 1042, 1049 (2001).
25. However, in the past we have both individually taken a position in these debates. See
Pearce, supra note 19; Wald, supra note 24. R
26. We do acknowledge, however, that our working definition does assume either that pro-
fessionalism, even if flawed and admittedly self-serving, is inherently desirable or at least redeem-
able, see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFES-
SION 230–57 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992), or that it could be utilized to induce lawyers to
behave in desirable ways, if only instrumentally to retain their elevated professional status. Some
commentators have explicitly rejected even such a weak definition of professionalism. Tom Mor-
gan, for example, defines professionalism as an anti-competitive apparatus and argues that it is
both increasingly irrelevant and undesirable. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN
LAWYER 66–69 (2010). Proponents of this vision may oppose the very notion of professional
education and, in particular, oppose law schools’ formation of professional identity on the ground
that it would further perpetrate the undesirable professionalism project.
27. Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer
as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009).
28. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 943 (1963); Wald, supra note 24, at 1075 (applying Arrow’s insights to the legal R
profession and advocating “an implicit social contract in which the legal profession guarantees the
quality of legal services, and in return . . . is granted effective self-regulation of the behavior of its
members.” (citation omitted)). But see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 648 (1981) (“[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of
professional conduct are not enforced.”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
HARV. L. REV. 468, 493 (1990) (noting rules of professional conduct tend to be “systematically
underenforced”).
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tion to representing clients, lawyers were to serve the public interest as of-
ficers of the legal system and as public citizens. In particular, as public
citizens, lawyers took leadership positions in public life, politics, and busi-
ness and served in prominent positions within their communities. Lawyers
thus constituted a governing class within American society. These roles en-
tailed a commitment to the rule of law, improving the law, and providing
access to legal services to all.29
To be sure, professional leaders have never agreed on, and ethical
codes have never prescribed, how to apply specifically the commitment to
the public good in concrete situations. For example, beyond aspiring to the
goal of increasing access to justice, the profession has never undertaken
steps to make equal access to legal services a reality, whether through ex-
traordinary voluntary or mandatory pro bono projects or through reform of
the legal system,30 and has not even pursued an effective commitment to
enhance access to its own ranks.31 Nor has it articulated standards that de-
fine and measure improvements to the law or commitment to the rule of
law.32 But while the specifics of this public service duty have never been
spelled out, there was always an understanding that such a duty existed, that
is, that lawyers owed a professional duty to conceive of their role as more
than serving as Holmesian bad men and women representing Holmesian
bad men and women clients, all in service of instrumentally maximizing
selfish interests at the expense of the public good.33
B. Autonomously Self-Interested and Relationally Self-Interested
Professional Accounts
This conventional account of the public service aspect of professional-
ism, however, has become increasingly detached from practice realities.
29. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolu-
tion of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 381, 384–87 (2001).
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2011). An aspirational pro bono standard is a
typical example of an under-developed rhetorical standard without meaningful commitment to
implantation. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Russell G. Pearce,
Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the
Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004).
While the profession has not articulated a detailed vision of commitment to the public good,
prominent lawyers and legal academics have done so. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportu-
nity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555 (1905); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
(2000); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007); WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRAC-
TICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (2000).
31. Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or
Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2011)
(discussing in general the challenges that diverse candidates face in pursuing a legal career).
32. David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study and
Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 76 (1999) (criticizing the profession and legal
education for a general failure to study the legal profession).
33. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2–6
(1988); Pearce, supra note 29, at 383.
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The profession has been experiencing a paradigm shift,34 in which the com-
mitment to the autonomous self-interest of clients has taken center stage. In
part, this development has been positive.  The vague assumption that law-
yers possessed superior practical wisdom skills compared with clients has
given way to narrower claims of expertise and specialization; the too com-
mon practice of paternalism toward clients has become less prevalent as
lawyers increasingly seek to ascertain actual client objectives and pursue
them systematically; and nebulous, albeit gentlemanly, billing practices
have been replaced with more efficient and accountable ones.35 With these
positive developments also came greater emphasis on the role of representa-
tion of clients to the exclusion of the roles of the officer of the legal system
and of a public citizen.36 More dramatically, lawyers have begun to deny
the existence of the public sphere beyond the aggregate of client interests
and of public duties separate from the duty to serve clients’ private
interests.37
Elsewhere, we have called these the relational self-interest and auton-
omous self-interest professional ideologies or accounts of professional-
ism.38 Relationally self-interested professionalism understands clients as
attempting to pursue and maximize their self-interest in relation to others,
conducting themselves pursuant to the principles of mutual benefit and mu-
tual respect. It understands lawyers’ role, in turn, as facilitators of such
relational goals, whose spirit of public service manifests itself in a duty to
act as civics teachers educating and advising clients to act relationally and
in a commitment to enhance access to legal services.39
Autonomous self-interest, in contrast, views clients as individualistic
and atomistic entities whose goal is to pursue and maximize their self-inter-
est aggressively without regard to others. In turn, it understands lawyers’
role to help clients act as Holmesian bad men and denies the existence of
any duties owed by clients or lawyers to the public interest. In this account,
the public interest is nothing more than an aggregate of clients’ private in-
34. Pearce, supra note 19, at 1230–33 (exploring the notion of ideological paradigm shifts). R
35. See Eli Wald, Glass-Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereo-
types, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245,
2264–73 (2010) (discussing large law firms’ shifting professional ideology from one based on
paternalism to an approach grounded in competitive client-centered service); Eli Wald, Loyalty in
Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909, 914–16
(2009) (exploring a lawyer’s loyalty to client in terms of pursuing actual rather than imputed
objectives).
36. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 5. R
37. Id. at 31–32.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Law Practice as a Morally Responsible Business: Reinte-
grating Values into Economics and Law 5 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://law2.fordham.edu/calfiles/flscal24523.doc; see also Green & Pearce, supra note 27 (ex-
plaining the lawyer’s role as a civics teacher).
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terests, and lawyers serve the public interest best by aggressively pursuing
clients’ autonomous self-interest.40
Autonomous self-interest has become the dominant professional para-
digm, well-grounded in the culture of autonomous self-interest prevalent
within and outside the legal profession. Relational self-interest, at one point
in time a powerful counterforce to autonomous self-interest, has been rele-
gated to marginal status.41
Our thesis in this article is that law schools have played a role in ele-
vating autonomous self-interest to its current position of dominance and
that they have a duty to help restore relational self-interest as a viable pro-
fessional account.
C. Professional Identity and Legal Education
The most recent Carnegie Report explains that “[l]aw schools play an
important role in shaping their students’ values, habits of mind, perceptions,
and interpretations of the legal world, as well as their understanding of their
roles and responsibilities as lawyers and the criteria by which they define
and evaluate professional success.”42
Becoming and acting as a professional entails certain commitments—
to think, speak, and behave in certain ways pursuant to a code of conduct.43
To become a lawyer, one must master a body of knowledge, acquire a profi-
ciency in a certain set of skills, and develop certain ways of thinking, rea-
soning, and acting. A lawyer must represent clients competently and
diligently, communicate with them effectively, charge reasonably, keep cli-
ent information confidential, and maintain loyalty to clients. A lawyer must
also respect the rule of law, strive to improve the law and increase access to
it, and practice law in the public spirit. Beyond these responsibilities, the
lawyer’s identity is further influenced by the perceptions and expectations
of others (clients, colleagues, opposing counsel, the other side, third parties,
family, and friends); her practice area; her place of employment; the market
40. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 17–18, 32. R
41. Id. at 32–36. To avoid confusion, both autonomous self-interest and relational self-inter-
est recognize not only the importance and relevance of self-interest but also its constitutive role in
fostering autonomy and self-determination in law students and lawyers alike. Accordingly, our
critique of autonomous self-interest is not an attack on but is rather consistent with recent scholar-
ship that emphasizes emotional health, well-being, and attention to law students’ autonomy sup-
port as inherent aspects of forming professional identity. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, The Most
Ethical of People, the Least Ethical of People: Proposing Self-Determination Theory to Measure
Professional Character Formation, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 168 (2011).
42. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 139. R
43. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construc-
tion of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993); Martha Minow, On Being a
Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 661
(2001).
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conditions; and, of course, her personal circumstances as well as other fac-
ets of her identity.44
All of these commitments, perceptions, and values—both personal and
professional—form and shape lawyers’ professional identity.45 The forma-
tion of professional identity is a long-term, dynamic, life-long journey.46 It
involves many profound experiences and many complex decisions, both ex-
plicit and implicit. Law school plays a foundational role in this journey.47
Indeed, it plays a constitutive role in introducing and forming professional
identity.
Surprisingly, however, law schools’ curricula pay very little to no ex-
plicit attention to most aspects of the complex issues that arise during the
formation and development of professional identity.48 Law schools do ad-
dress the acquisition of esoteric knowledge, ranging from learning to “think
like a lawyer;” to mastering bodies of legal doctrine; assessing, justifying,
and criticizing the law; and exercising professional judgment. They also
teach particular practice skills, mostly outside of the mainstream curriculum
and in the context of clinical education. And they offer a required class in
legal ethics, albeit one that usually does not even cover the law governing
lawyers beyond the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, let alone
other aspects of professionalism and professional identity.49 Yet the curric-
44. David B. Wilkins, Beyond “Bleached Out” Professionalism: Defining Professional Re-
sponsibility for Real Professionals, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 207 (Deborah H. Rhode ed., 2000).
45. The Carnegie Report does not draw an explicit distinction between professionalism and
professional identity. Rather, it implicitly suggests that professional identity is a set of beliefs,
convictions, and values that informs and shapes a professional’s conduct, hopefully, but not neces-
sarily, consistent with norms of professionalism. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 135. R
David Thomson interestingly proposes that “[p]rofessionalism relates to behaviors, such as timeli-
ness, thoroughness, respect towards opposing counsel and judges,” whereas “[p]rofessional iden-
tity relates to one’s own decisions about those behaviors.” David Thomson, Teaching Professional
Identity with Skills & Values Texts, LAW SCH. 2.0 (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.lawschool2.org/ls2/
2012/01/teaching-professional-identity-with-skills-values-discovery.html. We think of profession-
alism as a set of rules prescribing conduct and the ideology that informs and explains them, and of
professional identity as a set of values and convictions that an individual professional holds. See,
e.g., Melissa H. Weresh, I’ll Start Walking Your Way, You Start Walking Mine: Sociological
Perspectives on Professional Identity Development and Influence of Generational Differences, 61
S.C. L. REV. 337, 345–46 (2009).
46. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 23 (citing “growing empirical evidence that professional R
formation is developmental over a lifespan”).
47. Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the Virtue of Introspec-
tion: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 117, 119–20 (2001).
48. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of Pro-
fessional Identity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555, 557 (2007) (describing how legal education fails to
“focus[ ] on the development of lawyers’ professional identity” and arguing that such a focus
“would improve the administration of justice”); Rhode, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining that R
faculty reluctance to address professionalism “reflects skepticism about the value of discussing
values in professional school”); see also Gordon, supra note 8 (examining the modern American R
law school curriculum).
49. Instead, the required professional responsibility course tends to focus on the American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct in preparation for the MPRE examination.
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ulum mostly ignores issues such as professional values, commitments, be-
liefs, and ideologies; the organization and structure of legal workplaces;
career development; practice in the public service and the role of lawyers as
public citizens. Worse, to the extent that the curriculum implies a generic
professional identity—“thinking like a lawyer” suggests that there is one
right way of being and thinking like a lawyer—it offers an embellished,
bleached-out account of professionalism.50
Of course, as many have argued before, significant teaching occurs
through decisions law schools make regarding what they exclude from the
curriculum.51 The fact that no serious attempt is made by law schools to
tackle and explore issues of professionalism and professional identity re-
sults in what Deborah Rhode has called a “curricular irresponsibility to-
wards professional responsibility.”52 It suggests to students that thinking
about what it means to be a lawyer and what kind of a lawyer one wants to
be is far less important than “thinking like a lawyer.”
Furthermore, as Roger Cramton, Lani Guinier and Susan Sturm have
pointed out, significant implied teaching happens outside of the curriculum,
in the shadow of the dominant culture of law schools.53 Indeed, this implied
teaching forms and enforces autonomously self-interested professional
identity at the same time that it undermines and delegitimizes relational
alternatives.54
Borrowing from Richard Greenstein, one might argue that the required professional responsibility
class tends to marginalize and simplify the complex universe of lawyers’ professional obligations
reducing it to a set of rules of professional conduct. See Richard K. Greenstein, Against Profes-
sionalism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 328 (2009).
Perhaps not surprisingly, a recent empirical study shows that law students report effectively
learning legal ethics in law school, and, in particular, in the required professional responsibility
class; but failing to acquire sufficient explicit knowledge and appreciation of professional identity
and professionalism while in school. See Silver et al., supra note 13, at 399–402, 405.
50. See Levinson, supra note 43, at 1578–79 (defining “bleach[ed] out” professionalism as
creating “purely fungible” lawyers in which “[s]uch apparent aspects of the self as one’s race,
gender, religion, or ethnic background would become irrelevant to defining one’s capacities as a
lawyer”). For a discussion of the importance of bleached-out professionalism in the prevailing
ideology of legal practice, see Wilkins, supra note 44; David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles:
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1511–17 (1998).
51. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 253 (discussing the “hidden curriculum” R
of law schools); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at 521–22 (discussing the law school culture as it R
relates to professional development); Pearce, supra note 11, at 734 (describing research that indi- R
cates law schools make students less altruistic and less willing to do a public interest job).
52. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND.
L. REV. 23, 40 (2000).
53. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 253; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at R
521–22.
54. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK
LIKE A LAWYER” 98–99 (2007) (studying teaching methodologies employed in legal education,
documenting their impact on students’ professional values, commitments and habits of mind, and
arguing that such methodologies promote instrumental, adversarial even amoral mindsets at the
expense of contextual, emotional, and relational sensibilities).
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II. THE FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY IN LAW SCHOOL:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTONOMOUSLY SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEYS
Law schools form law students as competitive and adversarial profes-
sionals who are taught to believe that it is legitimate, and indeed desirable,
to pursue aggressively the interests of their clients, as well as their own
interests, without regard to the interests of their colleagues, neighbors, and
communities.  Law schools teach law students to view their classmates as
competitors and pursue their own autonomous self-interest as students. Au-
tonomously self-interested law students grow into autonomously self-inter-
ested attorneys, but law schools do not stop there. Rather, they teach
students to understand their clients as autonomously self-interested, and to
pursue their clients’ autonomous self-interest at the expense of their clients’
relational self-interest in considering the interests of opposing parties, third
parties, the public good, and the spirit of the law. Indeed, the law itself is
taught as a morally-free zone, a body of abstract principles subject to ma-
nipulation, in which the public interest is nothing more than an aggregate of
clients’ private interests, and in which a lawyer’s role is to pursue aggres-
sively her client’s autonomous self-interest.55
A. Explicit Institutional Adherence to Autonomous Self-Interest
In both its methodology and content, legal education views law
through the lens of the autonomous self, teaching students to understand the
law, clients, and themselves from the perspective of the Holmesian bad
man.
1. The Case Method
When Christopher Columbus Langdell developed the case method ap-
proach and the curriculum that is still dominant today, he expressly sought
to construct legal knowledge divorced from professional values and the re-
lational experience of law practice.56 This left little or no place for educa-
tion in either professional values or skills training. Indeed, Langdell’s
scientific approach regarded factual understanding of the law to exclude
values57 and rejected the pedagogical potential of apprenticeships.58 But
Langdell and his colleagues could take for granted a pervasive cultural un-
derstanding that lawyers were a leadership class of wise counselors and
55. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Knowledge for What?, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 41 (1999) (“Law
faculty need to pay more attention to their explicit and implicit messages to students and to the
profession as a whole . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERI-
CAN LEGAL EDUCATION 22–28 (1994); STEVENS, supra note 16, at 52–57. R
57. Pearce, supra note 11, at 728–30; see also Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Educa- R
tion for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2000) (discussing the
narrow approach taken by the modern casebook method).
58. See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 52–57. R
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meaningful actors in the public sphere.59 In this era in which lawyers often
occupied a position of influence with regard to their clients and their com-
munity, acted as statesmen and imparted practical wisdom,60 the preoccupa-
tion of the curriculum with establishing law as a science and law schools as
respectable academic institutions did not necessarily undermine the rela-
tional aspects of professionalism.61
Nonetheless, over time, this pedagogical approach helped shape stu-
dents’ professional identity as autonomously self-interested. As lawyers be-
gan to understand their role differently and diminish their commitment to
their role as officers of the legal system and as public citizens, legal educa-
tion’s failure to introduce and instill a relational approach to professional
identity began to have significant impact on the formation of law students.
Placing appellate decisions and the paradigm of adversarial combat at the
center of teaching law helped constitute autonomously self-interested pro-
fessionalism as the dominant ideology of the legal profession.62
Today, the case method orients students toward autonomous self-inter-
est through its focus on appellate decisions and “hard cases.” The case
method posits a universe of autonomous actors engaged in zero-sum com-
petitions63 in an adversarial and combative legal world, inevitably produc-
ing only winners and losers.64 Although the vast majority of disputes do not
59. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-
CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerald Gawalt ed., 1984) (examining the status of lawyers as social
elites and reformists); Pearce, supra note 29, at 384–87 (detailing the rise of lawyers to America’s R
governing class).
60. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
109–12 (1993) (discussing the case-method approach in the era of the lawyer-statesman ideal).
61. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 150. See generally Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, R
Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 449–50 (1996) (arguing that law should be taught as a science according to
the Langdell method).
62. Cf. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 612–15 (2007) (criticizing traditional law school teaching techniques).
63. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 8, 18. Indeed, to the extent that the case method teaches R
students to focus on distilled facts to the exclusion of their human and emotional context, it im-
plicitly delegitimizes relational approaches to professional identity. See Rhonda V. Magee, Legal
Education and the Formation of Professional Identity: A Critical Spirituo-Humanistic—“Human-
ity Consciousness”—Perspective, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 467, 475–76 (2007)
(describing the feelings of alienation and identity dissonance experienced by nontraditional law
students); Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational Experience of
First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 467 (2010) (explaining that the case method
“trivializes and even suppresses students’ values”).
64. Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law
School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 77–79 (2002) (summarizing the research showing that the law
school experience is stressful, intensely competitive, time-consuming, and anxiety producing); see
also Gordon, supra note 8, at 341 (describing the competitive atmosphere of the Harvard model). R
But see Paul D. Carrington, The Pedagogy of the Old Case Method: A Tribute to “Bull” Warren,
59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 460–61 (2010) (documenting educational reforms meant to reduce stu-
dent stress, if not time-commitment); Clinton W. Shinn, Lessening Stress of the 1L Year: Imple-
menting an Alternative to Traditional Grading, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 355, 368 (2010) (same).
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result in litigation and the majority of litigated cases settle,65 law schools do
not focus an equivalent portion of teaching on resolving disputes through
reconciliation and settlement.  Moreover, only a small number of litigated
cases result in appeals and of those only a very few reach the Supreme
Court. Teaching law students that the miniscule subset of legal matters that
result in appellate decisions represents lawyers’ work suggests to students
that law is inherently unsettled and controversial. The case method, as a
pedagogical matter, further teaches that the lawyer’s role is to attack, criti-
cize, and manipulate the law.66 As a matter of practice, of course, in most
cases the law is fairly clear and its meaning undisputed.
2. Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer”
In many law schools, and to many law professors, the hallmark of
legal education is teaching law students to “think like a lawyer.”67 The pre-
cise meaning of this exercise is often ill-defined, but it suggests a combina-
tion of two things, mastering analytic skills and exercising professional
judgment. In the first year, students become familiar with legal materials.
They learn to read case law by extracting the ratio decidendi—the holding
or the reasoning of the case—from the obiter dictum, the nonbinding parts
of the decision. They similarly learn to read and interpret statutes and sec-
ondary materials, as well as to draft litigation documents. They develop the
ability to make, and respond to, legal arguments.68 In the first year and
upper class courses, their teachers impress upon them that even the legal
doctrine they have come to master is often open-ended and ambiguous and,
at least outside of the trial court level—that is, either before courts of appeal
and before governmental agencies—is often open to indeterminate interpre-
tation.69 The goal of the case method is to arm students with various kinds
65. Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV.
4, 27–28 (1983) (offering empirical support to the fact that the vast majority of civil suits settle);
Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settle-
ments, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994). Indeed, Prof. Clermont concludes that:
settlement is . . . much more important than actual litigation . . . . [A]s settlement has
blossomed, the civil trial has all but disappeared recently, without any clear single
cause. The percentage of filed federal cases that see trial is now dropping toward 1.5%,
and state trials too have dropped off.
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 414–15 (2005). Similarly, a majority of
criminal prosecutions end in plea-bargain. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 419, 423 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1999).
66. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 253–56 (discussing contributing factors of R
skepticism in law school).
67. Sullivan & Podgor, supra note 47, at 117–118; see also Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem
Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Pal-
sgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 353–59 (1998) (examining the relationship between the case
method and learning to think like a lawyer).
68. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 249. R
69. Id. at 255.
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and types of arguments they may employ on behalf of clients, with the goal
of enabling them to learn the professional craft of lawyering.
Unfortunately, along the way, “thinking like a lawyer” is reduced to
the hired-gun ideology of “mak[ing] the best argument on behalf of your
client irrespective of the consequences to others.”70 Law students learn to
deploy their newly acquired professional talents to advocate on behalf of
clients’ narrow—and ostensibly private—interests, often at the expense of
the third parties, and the public interest.71 As a result, law students develop
the habit of using their skills to manipulate the letter of the law on behalf of
clients to the exclusion of the spirit of the law and its meaning within con-
text.72 And they learn to advocate aggressively on behalf of clients to the
exclusion of their duties as officers of the legal system and as public
citizens.73
Moreover, such an approach to “thinking like a lawyer” obscures the
richness of what it means be a lawyer, suggesting a simplified, autono-
mously self-interested view of lawyering. In particular, the approach sug-
gests that zealous representation of clients’ narrow interests is the only
straightforward way of thinking about being a lawyer and excludes mean-
ingful consideration of the rich and complex underlying values and commit-
ments of the legal profession.
To make matters worse, many law professors avoid teaching these val-
ues and commitments out of genuine belief that value pluralism requires
them to appear neutral before their students.74 Among that group, a few
esteem the spirit of the law but disdain an aspiration to the public good.75
Even when law professors themselves hold jurisprudential or “evaluative”
perspectives, whether grounded in economic efficiency, critical theory, crit-
ical race, feminist, or other approaches, they “do not teach about values.
They commonly apply an ‘instrumentalist’ approach that assumes that cer-
tain policy goals are worthy of pursuit, and then focuses students entirely on
whether the law ‘provides an appropriate means for the realization of
[those] goals.’”76 The result is a value vacuum, in which law students are
given the powerful tools of lawyering without guidance and direction and
then thrown into an increasingly competitive practice of law in which they
70. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 4–5.
71. Rhode, supra note 18, at 35 (“Legal course work too often seems largely a matter of R
technical craft, divorced from the broader concern of social justice . . . .”).
72. See Epstein, supra note 55, at 41 (explaining that professionalism is defined and prac-
ticed “as a craft without a moral dimension”).
73. See David Bromwich, On Privacy, DISSENT, Winter 1999, at 24 (Law schools’ narrow
technical curricular approach trains lawyers to become “pieceworkers” rather than guardians of
our liberties.).
74. Wendel, supra note 12, at 726–27.
75. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1473 (2006); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).
76. Pearce, supra note 11, at 730 (quoting Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 R
SMU L. REV. 1679, 1692 (1997)).
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encounter significant pressures to employ their skills exclusively on behalf
of the autonomous self-interest of clients.77 This, in turn, reinforces the
message that autonomously self-interested professionalism is not only legit-
imate and inevitable but also desirable.
3. The Curriculum
The dominance of the autonomous approach extends beyond the case
method and learning to “think like a lawyer” to the curriculum itself. The
first year, for example, “signals what it means to think and act like a law-
yer.”78 Howard Lesnick has observed that “it is what is imprinted in that
initial immersion [in the first semester of the first year], and not any broader
message of the three years, that shapes students’ consciousness of what is
important and not important to being a lawyer.”79 The first year showcases
private law and marginalizes public law.80 With the exception of criminal
law, the first year curriculum continues to emphasize private law subject
matters (contracts, torts, property, and civil procedure); and while public
law subject matters are no longer explicitly excluded from the curriculum,
they are mostly relegated to electives that only some students will take.81
Although private law and public law are both best understood relation-
ally, public law undeniably implicates considerations beyond the autono-
mous self while private law is more easily susceptible to analysis on the
level of the autonomous self. Private law classes tend to focus on the indi-
vidual client as a Holmesian bad man while marginalizing the role of law-
yers as officers of the legal system and as public citizens. The dominance of
private law courses in the first year of law school and the corresponding
absence of required public law courses reinforces the message and sets the
stage for autonomous self-interest to dominate the formation of professional
identity of law students. The failure to include professional responsibility,
as opposed to legal ethics,82 and skills teaching, let alone courses on public
citizenship and civic responsibility, bolsters the notion that both lawyers
and clients are autonomously self-interested and that formalistic, non-rela-
tional knowledge suffices to master lawyering.
Consider, for example, the place and role of alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) courses on the curriculum. ADR classes have grown in popular-
77. Rhode, supra note 18, at 26–30. R
78. Pearce, supra note 11, at 736. R
79. Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering as Por-
trayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157,
1159 (1990).
80. Gordon, supra note 8, at 340–41. R
81. Id. at 350.
82. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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ity and have become an established part of the curriculum.83 At the same
time, the place of ADR in the law school epitomizes the implicit teaching of
law school. ADR is generally not included with civil procedure or contracts
as a required first year course, but is relegated as an elective to the second
or third year. It thus becomes to students and law professors an exception to
mainstream law practice, professionalism and professional identity. ADR is
implicitly portrayed as a secondary, lesser option.
4. Implicit Teaching in the Shadow of Autonomous Self-Interest
Legal education occurs in the shadow of and reflects the legal profes-
sion’s dominant culture of autonomous self-interest. Law schools do not
explicitly teach that lawyers should serve as hired guns at the expense of the
clients’ relationships, the spirit of the law, the public good, and profession-
alism. They nonetheless implicitly and consistently promote autonomous
self-interest by arming students with powerful tools of reasoning and argu-
mentation and leaving them with little to guide them but the powerful cul-
ture of autonomous self-interest, which celebrates aggressive pursuit of
narrow client interests as the lawyer’s role.
Consider, for example, the concepts of fairness and justice. Law
schools could seek to instill in their students commitments to fairness, as
well as to procedural and substantive justice, even as they acknowledge
possible disagreement about the meaning of these concepts in particular cir-
cumstances. Many colleges, for example, teach undergraduates a class
called Justice, introducing and exploring the meaning of justice in particular
circumstances.84 Law schools, by contrast, tend to approach justice and fair-
ness primarily from a narrow procedural perspective, and leave even these
narrow concepts unexplored.85 Commentators note stories of law students
raising the issue of justice in class and faculty responding that law schools
teach law, not justice.86 This approach flows naturally from the culture of
83. Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of ADR in
Law Schools (and a Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
25, 29–33 (2010).
84. Peter L. Davis, Why Not a Justice School? On the Role of Justice in Legal Education and
the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 513, 535–39 (2007); Floyd, supra
note 48, at 555–57.
85. Id.
86.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A PO-
LEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 7 (1983); Pearce, supra note 11, at 730; see Deborah L. Rhode, R
Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 37 (1992) (describing the reluctance of
law schools to implement substantial courses in ethics); see also Russell G. Pearce, Learning from
the Unpleasant Truths of Interfaith Conversation: William Stringfellow’s Lessons for the Jewish
Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 255, 263 (1998) (citing A KEEPER OF THE WORD: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW 32 (Bill W. Kellermann ed., 1994)). As David Barnhizer has noted,
“[m]ost faculty in American law schools would deny the appropriateness of any mission that
requires them to either understand or advance justice.” David Barnhizer, The Justice Mission of
American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285, 286 (1992). Not surprisingly, similar stories
are told regarding Holmes’s approach to judging. In one famous account, Judge Learned Hand
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autonomous self-interest. In the adversary system, autonomous individuals,
with the assistance of their lawyers, pursue their self-interest as zealously as
possible and the invisible hand of the judge and jury determine the correct
result.87 Substantive justice has no place in legal education grounded in this
understanding.
Too often, justice is relegated to an elective class called jurisprudence,
understood by many law professors and law students alike as a “high the-
ory” class divorced from “practice realities.” As Karl Llewellyn has argued,
however, jurisprudence could be understood as the most practical and prac-
tice-oriented course on the curriculum.88 Its characterization as a theory
class alienates many students and reinforces the message that concepts such
as justice are foreign to the core of law practice and belong at the periphery
of the curriculum. Worse, sometimes even the few students who elect to
study jurisprudence encounter a course taught in a combative and adver-
sarial fashion, chronicling the cultural war between “law and economics”
and “critical legal studies,” and further obscuring the substantive examina-
tion and understanding of justice.
Interestingly, such an instrumental approach to the law, to clients, and
to the role of lawyers is manifested throughout the law school curriculum,
even in clinics and in programs committed to the advancement of the public
interest. Clinic clients and public interest causes are often treated just like
private clients. They are viewed through the lens of autonomous self-inter-
est, and understood to be best represented through aggressive pursuit of
their narrow self-interest.89 In other words, while clinics treat their own
said to Holmes “Do justice!” to which Holmes responded “That is not my job. My job is to play
the game according to the rules.” LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIB-
ERTY 302, 306–07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960); see generally Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”:
Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111 (1996) (exploring the history of the anec-
dote). Holmes also observed that “I have said to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which
means that I know if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking
thinking in legal terms.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (July 1, 1929), in
THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 435, 435 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
87. As Richard Posner noted, the adversary system “resembles the market in its impersonal-
ity, its subordination of distributive considerations. The invisible hand of the market has its coun-
terpart in the aloof disinterest of the judge.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
322 (1972); see also Pearce, supra note 30, at 970–71; Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics
and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 J. CORP. L. 469, 484,
488 (2004) (comparing analyses of ethics and the role of systematic neutralism in business and
legal ethics); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts
at Resuscitation, and Alternative Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
305, 312 (2000) (discussing the lawyer as hired gun, particularly to advance the interests of the
wealthy); David Luban, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 955, 974 (1995) (describing how the adversary system has been used to justify
social irresponsibility); W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J.
667, 698–99 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORAL-
ITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)).
88. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 105–22 (10th ed. 1996).
89. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 103, 127–28 (2010).
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students and clients relationally, they often teach students to treat other con-
stituencies and legal actors as autonomously self-interested.90
In a historical context, the autonomous tilt of law schools’ clinics is
understandable. Clinics have generally embraced client-centered advocacy
to supplant paternalistic approaches in which lawyers imputed goals and
objectives to clients and usurped clients’ decision-making authority. They
challenged the dominant understanding of clients, in Kate Kruse’s elegant
term, as cardboard clients and replaced that perspective with a commitment
to placing clients at the center of the client-attorney relationship. Despite
this positive goal, client-centered advocacy, especially when understood out
of the context in which it emerged, risks fostering an autonomously self-
interested sense of professional identity and professionalism by demonizing
not only the other side but also polarizing the law and legal system, collaps-
ing it into simplistic categories of good (public interest) and bad (for-profit
“sellout”) lawyers.
In sum, whether through express promotion of autonomously self-in-
terested lawyering or the absence of attention to professionalism and pro-
fessional identity, law schools send students both an express and implicit
message that autonomously self-interested professional identity is the inevi-
table and desirable way of thinking about and becoming a lawyer. As
Deborah Rhode eloquently states: “This minimalist approach to legal ethics
marginalizes its significance. Educational priorities are apparent in subtexts
as well as texts. What the core curriculum leaves unsaid sends a powerful
message that no single required course can counteract.”91 The lack of com-
mitment to study the profession and professional responsibility amount not
only to “curricular irresponsibility to professional responsibility”92 but also
to participation in the formation of autonomously self-interested profes-
sional identity—to the exclusion of other professional visions.
B. Implicit Institutional Adherence to Autonomous Self-Interest: Law
School’s Culture
In legal education, significant professional formation occurs outside of
the curriculum through the institutional culture.93 Several defining features
of the culture of legal education foster autonomous self-interest. From the
start, law schools place primary importance on grades, especially in the first
year, the formative year of legal education.94 Grades not only reflect a stu-
90. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 32–36 (exploring the expansion of autonomous self- R
interest within the profession); cf. Deborah J. Cantrell, Lawyers, Loyalty and Social Change, 89
DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
91. Rhode, supra note 18, at 28. R
92. Id. at 27.
93. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 252–53; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at R
519–20.
94. Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321,
329 (1982) (“First-year grades control the distribution of goodies: honors, law review, job place-
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dent’s knowledge and mastery of class materials but serve, quite explicitly,
as a sorting mechanism for future employers who rely on them in making
hiring decisions, especially for the most coveted positions: the law review
while in school and clerkships and employment with elite large law firms
and selective public interest positions after graduation.95
Reliance on grades is, of course, not unique to law schools. After all,
strong grades are necessary credentials for admission to law school. Never-
theless, the particular way law schools grade their students is especially
powerful in cultivating autonomous self-interest. Most first-year courses
and many second-year courses tend to be large classes where students re-
main anonymous to their professors and grades are assigned based on indi-
vidual performance on an anonymous exam. While some professors
experiment with collaborative learning tools,96 the basic model of law
school instruction is still the lecture (whether Socratic or otherwise), the
assignment of lengthy readings, and the individualized final exam. Grades
are assigned based on individual performance on an exam and are not, for
example, a function of the students’ interaction with each other (in group
assignments or based on class participation) or with the professor.97 The
experience is both isolating and individualistic. It provides disincentives to
group collaborations, or for engagements with colleagues and the professor
outside of the classroom.98 Moreover, most law schools employ a curve that
directly pits students against each other. Under the curve, relative perform-
ance and competing with one’s classmates is as important as objective per-
formance and mastery of knowledge, which makes no actual difference to
the curve.99 With this approach to grading, class rankings exacerbate the
competition between students. Finally, the autonomously self-interested
ment, and, because of the importance placed on these matters by the law school culture, even the
student’s sense of personal worth.”); see Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better 1L Assessments, 54
DUKE L.J. 765, 773–75 (2004) (summarizing the literature on the importance of first-year grades).
95. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at 528–29, 535–37. R
96. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Inglehart et al., From Cooperative Learning to Collaborative Writ-
ing in the Legal Writing Classroom, 9 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 185, 196–97
(2003) (describing potential applications of collaboration in a legal writing class); Dorothy H.
Evensen, To Group or Not to Group: Students’ Perceptions of Collaborative Learning Activities
in Law School, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 343 (2004) (relating students’ views of collaborative activi-
ties such as study groups). See also Course Portfolios, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, http://
educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/course-portfolios/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (showcasing in-
novative law school lesson plans).
97. Evensen, supra note 96, at 190.
98. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 2 (1997).
99. Id.
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spirit drives the students to work extremely hard,100 seeking individual suc-
cess at the expense of relational activities and pursuits.101
As Cynthia Epstein has observed:
[T]here is something of a winner-take-all attitude in the way
many schools rank their students and give them access to highly
visible opportunities such as law journals. Of course there must
be evaluations, but the hypercompetitive atmosphere typical of
many law schools is too clearly reproduced in the legal work-
place. Were schools to have a model of community . . . they
might have not reproduced the hierarchy we see in the
profession.102
In theory, the third year of law school could offer a different experi-
ence. Before the Great Recession, many law students had already secured a
job based on their first and second years’ grades and summer position, re-
ducing the competitive pressures and encouraging them to enroll in clinics,
electives, and seminars.103 But even when the job situation was more secure
than it is today, the reality of the third year of law school was often quite
disappointing. Law schools have been unsure about what to do with the
third-year curriculum and ambivalent about calls to abandon it all together
in favor of a two-year Juris Doctor. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Great
Recession, for students without jobs or with conditional offers, third-year
grades have become as competitive as those in the first and second years.104
Law schools also send a consistent message to students to view their
professors and institution with an autonomously self-interested lens. The
Case Dialogue Method105 (sometimes described as the Socratic Method), in
which a professor and a student engage in a grueling exchange, continues to
100. While note-sharing does occur at law schools (see, for example, Ayo Griffin, Zero L,
LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 9, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-
2002/scene_griffin_julaug2002.msp (referencing HL Central, a note-sharing website utilized by
students but not officially affiliated with Harvard Law School)), anecdotes abound regarding law
students’ refusal to share class notes with colleagues for fear of losing ground in the rat race for
grades.
101. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 37–39. R
102. Epstein, supra note 55, at 47 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist
Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993) and Michael Burns, The Law
School as a Model for Community, 10 NOVA L.J. 329 (1986)).
103. Eli Wald, The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051,
2053 (2010) (pointing out that the Great Recession often accelerated ongoing restructuring trends
in the legal profession, including hiring practice realities at large firms).
104. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, GOAL III REPORT 5,
9 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/2010GoalIII.pdf (“For law graduates
of the class of 2008, NALP reported that the employment of new law graduates dropped to 89.9%,
the first decline since 2003. Also, the legal community saw many of the larger law firms defer the
hiring of new associates and overqualified attorneys apply for positions traditionally held by re-
cent law school graduates.”); Gary A. Munneke & Deb Volberg Pagnotta, Unexpected Career
Transitions, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 2009, at 44 (“Beginning in 2008 and continuing into 2009, lawyer
layoffs from firms of all sizes have occurred in record numbers.”).
105. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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epitomize legal education.106 And while fewer professors employ the tradi-
tional Case Dialogue Method, especially outside of the first-year curricu-
lum, it symbolizes the essence of law school instruction. Whatever the Case
Dialogue Method’s virtues;107 it relies on adversarial relationship between
professor and student.108 Moreover, the Case Dialogue Method fosters an
understanding of law professors as hierarchical superiors rather than as
mentors, and promotes arm’s length instruction rather than professional
community and collaboration.109
Most law professors further maintain hierarchy and inaccessibility by
failing to take proactive mentorship roles.110 A growing body of literature
identifies mentorship as a fundamental aspect of the formation of profes-
sional identity,111 but many law faculty do not establish mentoring relation-
ships with students. With regard to careers, faculty generally do not work
with administrators in Students Affairs and Career Offices.112 Outside of
clinics and legal writing classes, most faculty do not teach skills and mentor
students in developing them.113 To the extent that skills mentorship occurs,
classroom faculty delegate them to clinical faculty or to legal writing in-
structors who are often untenured.114
Moreover, law schools cultivate a reputation as ivory tower enclaves
detached from the concerns of law students and practicing lawyers. Con-
sider how law schools have responded to increasing complaints about the
cost of legal education and the perceived decline of the value of the JD
degree.115 When journalists criticized law schools for a lack of trans-
parency—or actual misrepresentation—regarding data generally and espe-
cially regarding the employment statistics of their graduates,116 some law
school representatives accepted responsibility but many blamed the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the U.S. News & World Report for any problems.
With regard to the cost of legal education, law school representatives de-
fend the status quo and explain that funding scholarship requires high tui-
tion. Few, in contrast, have sought either affirmatively to defend the
educational mission of law schools or seriously to consider structural
reforms.117
106. Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our
Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 769 n.37 (2003).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Carasik, supra note 1, at 788–90. R
110. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at 535. R
111. See Neil Hamilton & Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, Fostering Professionalism through Mentor-
ing, 57 LEGAL EDUC. 102 (2007).
112. Carasik, supra note 1, at 788–90.
113. Id.
114. Weresh, supra note 45, at 346–57.
115. See supra note 5. R
116. See supra note 16. R
117. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 7, at 539–49. R
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Other cultural influences include attitudes toward public service. Law
schools begin the process that renders “law with a compassionate element
or a public service component . . . a specialization”118 and preside over a
process in which “many students . . . who bring ‘caring’ as a motivating
element in their choice of law as a profession change that perspective dur-
ing law school.”119 Regrettably, “[l]egal education channels students away
from public interest careers and discourages legal practice on behalf of the
poor and the underprivileged[.]”120
Law schools similarly shape student attitudes toward gender roles.
Cynthia Epstein notes that “[f]or many students law school reinforces the
cultural view that it is fitting for women to take care of the underprivileged
classes and address low-profit arenas of the law, and fitting for men to prac-
tice high-wire transactions in the large firms.”121 Moreover, “[s]omething
goes on in the subculture of law schools, and of course in the larger culture,
to reinforce the idea that men must make the money.”122 Law schools’ re-
production of the dominant ideology of autonomous self-interest, with its
culture of adversarial zeal and of individualistic pursuit either produce con-
ditions that create or tolerate gender inequality by suggesting to students
that it is not their concern or responsibility to address substantive gender
equality in legal education and in the legal profession.
Law schools also permit and reinforce racial inequality. Indeed, the
culture of autonomous self-interest denies the existence of any meaningful
identity whatsoever but for an autonomously self-interested identity. It
therefore defines the dominant whiteness as normal and other racial back-
grounds as “other.”123 The case method, for example, under the guise of
“objectivity of legal analysis,” normalizes whiteness and white privilege
with the effect of encouraging white students to avoid the reality of “racial
subordination” and marginalizing students of color (and white students)
who challenge white privilege.124 As Kimberle Crenshaw explains, “to as-
118. Epstein, supra note 55, at 42.
119. Id. at 43 (citing Robert Granfield’s study of Harvard Law School students that found that
while 65% of first year students were interested in solving social problems and fostering social
change, only 32% of third-year students shared these commitments).
120. Id.; MERTZ, supra note 54.
121. Epstein, supra note 55, at 46.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, Competing Narratives, Competing Jurisprudences: Are Law
Schools Racist? And the Case for an Integral Critical Approach to Thinking, Talking, Writing,
and Teaching About Race, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 777, 780–81 (2009); Margalynne J. Armstrong &
Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to
Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635, 639–44 (2008); Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from
Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 68 (1994); Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering:
Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2082–83 (2005);
CARRIE YANG COSTELLO, THE PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SUC-
CESS AT PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS (2005).
124. See, e.g., Rob Trousdale, White Privilege and the Case-Dialogue Method, 1 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. RAZA J. 28, 39–41 (2010). See Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centrip-
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sume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom, minor-
ity students must participate in the discussion as though they were not
African-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts.”125 In these ways,
the culture of autonomous self-interest reinforces the racial inequalities that
exist within society as a whole and forecloses the opportunity that legal
education presents to systemically redress those inequalities among future
lawyers and create a community of racial equality among racially diverse
students.
As a result of all these factors, the cultural climate of law schools in-
fuses students with professional sensibilities that legitimize and celebrate
autonomous self-interest. That law schools become arenas that sustain,
legitimize, and reproduce an autonomously self-interested status quo to the
exclusion of relational alternatives is particularly lamentable. They have the
capacity to—and should—lead the way in the legal profession’s quest for
substantive equality, justice and fairness—values that tend to get forgotten,
if not undermined, by autonomous self-interest culture and ideology.
C. Law Professors’ Modeling of Autonomous Self-Interest
Law professors themselves very much embody and epitomize autono-
mous self-interest. Most law professors graduated at the top of their classes
at elite law schools, thereby demonstrating their mastery of the dominant
culture of autonomous self-interest.126 Increasingly, moreover, many have
limited practice experience, consisting of either prestigious clerkships or
relatively short stints in elite positions. Others have no practice experience
at all, instead coming to teach law school with a prestigious graduate
degree.127
Many aspects of becoming and being a successful law professor impli-
cate autonomous self-interest. Most entry-level professors have emerged at
the top of hypercompetitive legal education institutions. Although relational
connections are an important part of every workplace, they are generally not
recognized in the narrative of career advancement for law professors. The
narrative identifies success (promotion internally or upward lateral mobility
etal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 847, 883–84 (2000).
125. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35–36 (1994).
126. Ezra Rosser, On Becoming “Professor”: A Semi-Serious Look in the Mirror, 36 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 215, 221–23 (2009) (describing his experiences at Yale Law School as a newcomer to
the dominant culture).
127. In a recent blog post on The Legal Whiteboard, Andy Morriss eloquently explains how
the proliferation of PhD holders within law professors’ ranks tends to produce a “full-blown,
massive infection” of “theory envy,” which in turn elevates theoretical scholarship to the top of
the totem pole and belittles and delegitimizes other aspects of being a law professor. See Andrew
Morriss, Theory Envy, THE LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Feb. 6, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
legalwhiteboard/2012/week6/index.html.
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to a higher ranked law school) with individual merit measured by publica-
tions in prestigious law reviews.128 Moreover, law schools do not tend to
give the same value to obviously relational responsibilities, such as teaching
or service. As Carasik notes, “[b]ecause efforts unrelated to scholarly out-
put often go unnoticed and unrewarded, both financially and in terms of
recognition, it sends a tacit message,” not only to law professors but also to
the student body, that “these contributions to the life of the law school are
devalued.”129
Law professors who lack practice experience are handicapped in form-
ing professional identity. They are in a position of “do as I say, not as I do,”
yet it is important to note that this state of affairs is not inevitable. Law
professors have chosen to abandon the full-time practice of law (if they ever
practiced full time) in favor of full-time academia. One manifestation of
this reality is the way many law professors display disdain for lawyers and
law practice,130 and often employ simplistic stereotypes of “good” and
“bad” lawyers, suggesting that students who opt for private practice are
“sellouts” and that students who commit to public practice are “heroes.”131
Making this message more problematic is that, as we have seen, law
schools’ curricula and culture offer a contrary perspective on public ser-
vice.132 Taken together, these negative perspectives alienate students from
their future practice of law and from their professors.133
This simplistic perspective on practice also prevents law professors
from being effective teachers of professional values. Elsewhere we develop
the idea that, in their daily practice and in their public role, lawyers act and
should act as civics teachers, introducing, educating, and advising clients to
act relationally in the public spirit.134 The case for viewing law professors
as civics teachers is even stronger. After all, law professors are teachers,
and who is better to teach future lawyers about becoming civics teachers
than their own teachers? Unfortunately, law professors who show disdain
128. Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupa-
tion with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competence Obstruct Reform in
the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 136 (2010).
129. Carasik, supra note 1, at 808. R
130. See, e.g., Amy M. Colton, Eyes to the Future, Yet Remembering the Past: Reconciling
Tradition with the Future of Legal Education, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 963, 970 n.38 (1995)
(“[T]he faculty’s job is to train students for the practice of law, yet many professors hold the
practice in contempt.”).
131. Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 807–08
(1971) (asserting that the movement’s rhetoric, which distinguishes public interest lawyers (so
called “good guys”) from other lawyers (“bad guys”) undermines the goal of expanding represen-
tation to unrepresented individuals); Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over
the Meaning of “Public Interest Law”, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223 (2005); Scott L. Cummings &
Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357
(2010).
132. See discussion supra Part II.A–B.
133. Sullivan & Podgor, supra note 47, at 118–19.
134. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Green & Pearce, supra note 27. R
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for actual practice and for the law itself undermine their own ability to serve
as civics teachers.
Finally, law professors model individualism and often poor relational
self-interest. Law professors teach alone and maintain formal hierarchies
both vis-a`-vis students and vis-a`-vis non-tenure-track and tenured faculty.
They show little commitment to relational interests and to the public inter-
est, failing, for example, to pursue pro bono commitments vigorously.135
As long as the narrative of autonomous self-interest remains dominant
among law faculty, they will continue to maintain the fiction of an autono-
mously self-interested perspective on scholarship (despite its many rela-
tional dimensions) and to devalue the obligations of teaching and service
where the relational components are clear. They will similarly disdain the
reality of law practice with its many relational aspects. Accordingly, they
will be hostile—or unreceptive—to proposals to reform legal education in a
relational dimension. This resistance is very powerful—the faculty are often
the constituency charged with promoting reform and they have a vested
interest in the status quo.136 This is not to ignore the fact that many in legal
education genuinely seek reform. But efforts that do not confront the ways
the dominant paradigm shapes positions of power in the legal academy, and
rewards the autonomously self-interested, are unlikely to succeed. Indeed,
these factors help explain the very limited influence of the 1992 MacRate
Report,137 or the more recent 2007 Carnegie and CLEA Reports138 on the
formation of professional identity in law schools. Reforming legal educa-
tion, therefore, requires more than curricular and institutional changes. It
also necessitates a corresponding reimagining of the role of law professors
and their duties to students and the legal profession.
III. THE CASE FOR RELATIONAL SELF-INTEREST IN LAW SCHOOLS
A. Why Law Schools Must Help Form Professional Identity
Autonomous self-interest has become dominant in American culture
generally.139 Accordingly, by the time students arrive at law school, many
are either pre-disposed toward, or have already adopted, an autonomously
self-interested perspective. Furthermore, law schools have only a limited
opportunity to form the professional identity of their students over three
years of legal education. Indeed, formation of professional identity is a life-
long proposition, and many other institutions (such as law firms and bar
135. David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58,
70–73 (1999).
136. Carasik, supra note 1, at 816–17 (“Perhaps the biggest impediment to meaningful reform R
is the potentially insurmountable challenge of motivating academics to act against their own per-
ceived self-interest in maintaining the status quo.”).
137. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 2.
138. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2; CLEA REPORT, supra note 2.
139. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 3.
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associations) as well as individuals (judges, practitioners, clients, and third
parties) and market forces (competition, specialization, and the commodi-
tization of legal services) will have a longer impact on the professional
identity of lawyers than law schools.
Moreover, personal and professional values intersect and are interre-
lated, such that law students’ preexisting personal beliefs, values, and com-
mitments set the stage and inform their perspectives regarding professional
ideas. As David Wilkins argues compellingly, the inherent relationship be-
tween personal and professional identities is desirable, as opposed to
“bleached-out professionalism,” which purports to supersede competing
personal identities.140
Nevertheless, law schools do have a meaningful opportunity to help
form their students’ professional identity. As Deborah Rhode has explained,
law schools “have a distinctive responsibility to examine both the public
life that law helps constitute and the professional life of those who help
constitute law.”141 While students arrive at law schools as adults holding
some established personal values, they generally have little experience in
applying those values to the work of a lawyer. Many are therefore likely to
seek to understand professional values and identity. Indeed, they probably
expect law schools to teach them how to be a lawyer whose conduct satis-
fies the highest professional standards. And, practically speaking, as we
have shown in Part II, law schools have in fact been engaged in the forma-
tion of professional identity.
But should they be? One possible reply to our contention that law
schools have been engaged in the formation of professional identity is that
they should not be engaged in such a project. This seems to us like an
implausible position to maintain for two reasons. First, law schools have no
choice but to form the professional identity of students. As critical scholars
have demonstrated compellingly, it is impossible to analyze and apply the
law in a neutral fashion, divorced from political, social, and cultural con-
texts.142 Similarly, it would be impossible for law schools to educate law-
yers without, at least implicitly, taking a stand either about the meaning of
law or the role of lawyers and their professional identity. Simply pretending
140. See Wilkins, supra note 44.
141. Rhode, supra note 18, at 24. R
142. Gordon, supra note 33, at 22–29 (“[P]olitical judgments are virtually inescapable . . .
[and] even such tactful and delicate counseling involves discretion, and every exercise of that
discretion entails making ‘political’ decisions. For even if the lawyer wanted to, the lawyer simply
could not neutrally, objectively, inform the client what the probable legal implications would
be . . . . The very language and tone in which lawyers speak of the law to their clients is a local
political action that subtly reinforces or subverts [the law].”); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice
and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991) (noting that because it is
hard to distinguish a judgment that a client’s choice is autonomous from a judgment that a choice
is in the client’s best interests, a lawyer often cannot avoid influencing a client when advising
about his best interests).
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that law schools can successfully avoid taking a position on professional
identity is both naı¨ve and implausible.143 Professional identity is nothing
more than a set of values, commitments, and habits of mind associated with
the practice of law. At minimum, law schools teach and produce lawyers,
and in doing so they necessarily instill in their students a sense of profes-
sional identity.
Second, not only do law schools inevitably form the identity of their
students, but they have an affirmative responsibility to prepare good law-
yers. For better or worse, lawyers play an important role in American soci-
ety. If not high priests of civic society, they certainly are meaningful actors
in the lives of their clients and communities,144 who play the role of civics
teachers in our highly regulated society.145 Law schools therefore have a
duty to educate and inform future lawyers about their duties to clients, the
legal system, and the public, and to educate them to professional values that
will inform how they fulfill their role. Law schools further have a duty to
foster “cultures of commitment” to the profession’s core values of integrity
and public service.146 Teaching professional identity requires a responsibil-
ity to examine concrete concerns, such as promoting equal access to justice
in light of the inadequate access to justice for low- and moderate-income
citizens,147 equal opportunity given discrimination and under-representation
in the legal profession, and compliance with professional values of loyalty
and integrity.
Indeed, some have advocated a far grander role for law schools, one
that goes beyond the formation of professional identity. Anthony Kronman,
for example, calls on law schools to take a lead role in restoring our
maligned public life, arguing that “[o]ur public life is in despair,”148 repair-
ing it “will require patient thought,”149 and law professors ought to assume
a primary responsibility for it, as they are “the legal profession’s intellectual
specialists.”150 Elsewhere we have called upon lawyers to act as civic teach-
ers;151 and while we believe that all members of the profession are under a
143. Cramton, Ordinary Religion, supra note 15, at 262–63; cf. Sturm & Guinier, supra note R
7.
144. Epstein, supra note 55, at 41 (“Given lawyers’ central roles in legislating, interpreting,
and sometimes in circumventing values, legal educators ought to consider their own powerful
roles in professional socialization.”).
145. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Green & Pearce, supra note 27. R
146. Rhode, supra note 18, at 26. R
147. See, e.g., Alex Gourevitch & Aziz Rana, America’s Failed Promise of Equal Oppor-
tunity, SALON (Feb. 12, 2012, 9:00 a.m.), http://www.salon.com/2012/02/12/americas_failed_
promise_of_equal_opportunity/.
148. Anthony T. Kronman, Our Beleaguered Public World, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 50, 56 (1999).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 52.
151. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17.
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duty to proactively restore civility and public life, we agree that law profes-
sors have the ability and should lead this effort, if only by example.152
It should be noted that while Kronman emphasizes law professors’ in-
tellectual capacities and scholarly expertise, we caution that such an exclu-
sive focus may be part of the problem: law schools and law professors, in
their celebration of theoretical scholarship, have neglected to develop a
commitment to professionalism in terms of teaching, and even more so,
service to the student body and the greater community.153 Implicitly, law
schools have embraced a culture of autonomous self-interest that ends up,
we submit, eroding efforts to promote professional ideals.
B. Why Law Schools Must Help Form Relationally Self-Interested
Students
If law schools accept their duty to engage in the formation of profes-
sional identity, why not accept autonomous self-interest as the only legiti-
mate and desirable approach? Should law schools look to reject
autonomous self-interest as a sole foundation for lawyers’ professional
identity?
Elsewhere we develop at great length the concepts of relational and
autonomous self-interest and argue that relational self-interest is a more de-
sirable approach to understanding the lawyer’s role.154 Briefly, we contend
that people inherently are, and wish to be, relational; and that lawyers and
their clients would find more satisfaction in their lives if they pursued rela-
tional self-interest.155 Moreover, lawyers play a vital role in resolving pri-
vate and public disputes, and in serving as civics teachers to clients and
community, should act more relationally and should encourage their clients
and their neighbors to do so as well.156 Indeed, we assert that lawyers owe a
particular duty to help restore a culture of relational self-interest precisely
because they have played an active role in constructing and advancing the
culture of autonomous self-interest and elevating it to its dominant
position.157
Here we need not go that far. Even assuming that some may disagree
that lawyers ought to advance relational self-interest both in how they un-
derstand their own role and in how they conceive of their clients, it seems
clear that law schools ought to advance and promote relational self-interest
152. “[T]hinking is our specialty, it is what we do for a living, and it does not seem implausi-
ble to hope that by practicing our special discipline we can make a contribution to the search for
answers to these questions [of restoring the public life], a search in which many others are en-
gaged.” Kronman, supra note 148, at 56.
153. See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text.
154. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Pearce & Wald, supra note 39.
155. Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 43–52.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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as a viable alternative to autonomous self-interest. Law students, unlike ma-
ture experienced lawyers, are in the early formative years of their profes-
sional development. Rather than implicitly advancing only one approach to
professional identity, law schools should explicitly and openly offer their
students alternative visions of professional identity, so their students can
choose on an informed basis the kind of lawyers they wish to become and
the kind of professional values they wish to adopt.158 Some future lawyers
may choose autonomous self-interest as their guiding professional ideology,
but the least law schools should do is offer compelling alternatives. Simply
advocating autonomous self-interest, and impliedly so, without doing jus-
tice to viable alternatives, undermines freedom of inquiry into subjects of
exceptional relevance to both students and teachers.
C. How Law Schools Can Form Relationally Self-Interested Students
As described above in Parts I and II, autonomous self-interest is the
dominant culture that informs curriculum design, teaching styles, the values
of law professors, the organization of law faculties, and, in turn, treatment
of law students. It is also, for the most part, an implied approach. As such, it
is going to be hard and time consuming to modify. There are no quick fixes
or magic solutions law schools can implement, no closed list of practices
that ought to be abandoned, and no mandatory prescription for reforms.
Cultural change is difficult to achieve. Below we explore ideas across a
range of spheres that can help foster relational approaches to professional
identity, keeping in mind the ideological hurdles and incentive schemes that
sustain the status quo.
While advancing relational self-interest in legal education, at least
alongside and in addition to autonomous self-interest, would seem unobjec-
tionable, we anticipate significant opposition to it in practice. As we explain
above, the dominant culture among law professors is autonomous self-inter-
ested.159 For them to effectively advance and model relational self-interest,
law professors will have to change themselves and become more relation-
ally self-interested with regard to their students, colleagues, law schools,
and communities. Because the required change entails not only rethinking
how they teach, serve, and practice being a law professor, but also who they
are as law professors, law professors are likely to resist it. Current hiring
and promotion practices compound the challenge, as they tend to reward
and promote the very individuals who tend to comport with autonomous
self-interest.
Moreover, relational approaches, by definition, require a significant in-
vestment in relationships—with students, colleagues, administrators, and
158. See, e.g., RUSSELL G. PEARCE, DANIEL J. CAPRA & BRUCE A. GREEN, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 767–901 (2011).
159. See supra Part II.C.
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other members of the legal community. Law professors are unlikely to em-
brace a vision of law practice and of their role as law professors that entails
such a significant commitment, if only because many prize their autonomy
and flexibility above all.160 Embracing a relational understanding of their
role will require them to spend many more hours in the office and to sacri-
fice valuable scholarly time and energy, risking reduced scholarly
productivity.161
Nonetheless, because we believe that relational self-interest is a funda-
mental element of law schools’ formation of professional identity, we offer
a provisional program for infusing legal education with relational self-inter-
est. In doing so, we seek to open a conversation regarding relational ap-
proaches to legal education that draws upon many of the existing proposals
for reform.
1. Explaining Professional Values
Legal education must explain professional values in terms of relational
self-interest. Professional values are by definition relational. They implicate
relationships with clients, colleagues, and community. To students steeped
in a culture of autonomous self-interest, the current approach of appealing
to abstract commitments, such as honesty, loyalty, civility, and pro bono,
have some, but minimal persuasive effect. The typical strategy for justify-
ing lawyers’ professional commitments is to place them in the context of
the dichotomy between self-interested business people and altruistic profes-
sionals. But students who embrace autonomous self-interest will view law-
yers as being just as self-interested as business people and will hear these
appeals as hypocritical, cynical, or foolish.162 In contrast, relational self-
interest provides a language for bridging professional values and students’
belief that lawyers are self-interested. Because we are all connected, self-
interest understood relationally creates a culture of trust, civility, and equal
justice.163 In this way, relational self-interest allows students to move be-
yond understanding themselves and their clients as Holmesian bad men and
women.164 Relational self-interest also links their being a lawyer with the
rest of their lives. It accordingly allows students to draw on their personal
values as a resource in their work as law students and lawyers and allows
them similarly to understand their clients as full human beings.
160. Id.
161. Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and Intrinsic Worth,
96 IOWA L. REV. 1579, 1611 (2011); Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solu-
tions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 419 (1998).
162. Pearce, supra note 19, at 1265.
163. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Robert K. Vischer, Trust and the Global Law
Firm, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1095 (2011).
164. See, e.g., Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Beyond Cardboard Lawyers in Legal Ethics, 15
LEGAL ETHICS 125 (2012); Kruse, supra note 89.
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2. Curricular Reform
The curriculum should reflect a commitment to relationally self-inter-
ested professional identity—or at least to formation of professional identity
in a way that allows for a variety of perspectives, including relational self-
interest. Currently, law schools’ curricula do very little expressly to foster
any sense of professional identity; or, more accurately, the lack of serious
attention in the curriculum sends a message about its minor significance and
enhances the background form of autonomous self-interest. By and large,
what most law schools do is feature inspirational talks at orientation and
graduation, and teach the required class in legal ethics, which focuses heav-
ily on the law governing lawyers, not the formation of professional identity.
Law schools could instead make the promotion of professional identity an
institutional priority in the required professional responsibility course, as
well as throughout the curriculum and the law school culture.
a. Rethinking “Thinking Like a Lawyer”
Curricular change must begin with the concept of “thinking like a law-
yer.” This is where many, but certainly not all, reform efforts stumble. The
Carnegie Report, for example, for the most part embraces the existing first-
year approach, and its particular conception of “thinking like a lawyer.”165
As explained above,166 the Case Dialogue Method, as generally practiced,
teaches an understanding of thinking like a lawyer that encourages students
to see themselves and their clients as Holmesian bad men and women. De-
spite the pervasiveness of this approach, the rigorous teaching of analysis
and doctrine does not require indoctrination into autonomous self-
interest.167
Instead, the effort to teach students fluency in the language of the law
could readily rely on materials and commitments that reflect the reality of
law practice.  For example, rather than focus exclusively on litigated, appel-
late cases, the materials themselves could offer the variety of situations that
lawyers encounter, including counseling, transactions, and cooperative dis-
pute resolutions. These materials would further encourage a dialogue be-
tween student and professor that is not based in adversarialism, but rather a
panopoly of approaches, including making experiential learning an essential
component of every course. They would also lend themselves to coopera-
tive exercises, both inside and outside the classroom, where the students
learn to work collaboratively and support each other in their efforts to think
like a lawyer.168
165. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, (acknowledging that thinking like a lawyer undermines
moral reflection but suggesting ways to do both). See also MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 2. But
see GUINIER ET AL., supra note 4, MERTZ, supra note 54.
166. See supra Part II.A.1.
167. See, e.g., GUINIER ET AL., supra note 4; MERTZ, supra note 54.
168. See supra note 10.
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Expanding the notion of thinking like a lawyer also provides an oppor-
tunity to teach students regarding how their work as lawyers is inextricably
intertwined with the quality of justice in our society. As noted above, the
dominant approach of exclusively focusing on autonomous self-interest
leads some faculty to tell students who ask about justice that the subject
matter of the class is law, not justice.169 A broader approach to how lawyers
truly think and practice recognizes that the law is a fundamental building
block of our society.170 How lawyers think has implications for society’s
commitments to justice, fairness and equality, and its relational aspects.171
Teaching how to think about justice would not be simple, and would require
students to learn theoretical approaches to justice, as well as their practical
application, but it is the only way to fulfill lawyers’ obligations as “public
citizens” who will inevitably influence the justness of specific outcomes, as
well as of public policy.172
Last, integrating the lawyer’s role as a public citizen would suggest
introducing a greater immersion in public law topics into the first year cur-
riculum. These topics easily lend themselves to consideration of lawyers’
inevitable connection to the public good, even though such considerations
are present in all aspects of lawyers’ everyday work, including the represen-
tation of private interests. We include our suggestion for a revised curricu-
lum in the Appendix. Of course, our point is not to debate the specifics of a
new curriculum, but rather to suggest that the traditional curriculum “runs
out” in part because it neglects public law, a commitment to practicing law
in the public spirit, and professionalism. Our proposal would make “think-
ing like a lawyer” a central inquiry of all three years of law school. The
second- and third-year curriculum, in addition to skills instruction, should
include consistent explicit treatment of the meaning of professionalism,
professional values, habits of mind, and commitments.
169. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text.
171. See id.; Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Pearce & Wald, supra note 39.
172. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 84; Floyd, supra note 48. We note that contrary to our posi-
tion, Kronman rejects the concept of commitment to substantive justice as an inherent aspect of
the meaning of professionalism. Kronman, supra note 149, at 53. Kronman believes that the ero-
sion of the private/public divide is lamentable and unnecessary and asserts that law, lawyers, and
law schools ought to help restore the private and public spheres as at least semi-separate zones by
focusing on pursuing formal and procedural justice. Id. at 52–53. We believe that the private/
public distinction is false and that what is designated as “private” is often an attempt, or has the
practical consequence, even when it is a decision by the state, to endorse the status quo. See
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835,
845–46 (1985) (explaining there is no natural sphere of private life; rather, the state makes choices
regarding which spheres in which it will become involved, thus such “private” is a collective
decision). Importantly, for purposes of engaging in a meaningful debate about the culture, content,
and future of legal education it does not matter who has the better argument with regard to the
private/public divide. Rather, the point is that law schools should engage their students in explicit
and open discourse about the competing meaning of justice and their duties to it as professionals,
instead of implicitly pushing only the agenda of autonomously self-interested professionalism.
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b. Making Formation of Professional Identity a Priority
Explicit consideration of the formation of professional identity must
become the focus of greater curricular attention both in classes devoted spe-
cifically to the topic, as well as in classes more generally insofar as without
this express commitment they will teach professional identity implicitly. A
minimum commitment is to make professional responsibility a first semes-
ter, first-year class so that students understand that it forms an essential
component of thinking like—and being—a lawyer.173 The professional re-
sponsibility course would of course include the rules and law of lawyering,
but even more important would introduce students to the values and com-
mitments they would undertake as professionals. In the process, the pro-
posed curriculum would include various approaches to and understandings
of professionalism, rejecting a blind adherence to autonomous self-interest
and exposing students to a rich array of perspectives allowing them to
make, more explicitly and on an informed basis, choices about the kind of
lawyers they wish to be. If law schools took professional formation seri-
ously, the first year, first-semester course would only serve as the beginning
of a professionalism track that would allow students to deepen their under-
standing of their professional identity and to integrate it into the other cour-
sework and experiences they encounter at law school. In the Appendix, we
suggest one possible track that includes courses in Legal Ethics, The Pro-
fessions, Legal Profession, Pro Bono, and Justice. At the same time, moreo-
ver, the formation of professional identity must become pervasive
throughout the curriculum to underscore the connection between profes-
sional values and all components of lawyers’ work.174
c. Expanded Experiential Learning
Like many other commentators,175 we urge both special courses and
pervasive teaching of experiential learning so that students understand the
relational dimension of what they are learning at law school. We caution,
though, that such teaching not devolve into viewing lawyers and clients
through the lens of autonomous self-interest that understand them as card-
board characters.176 Mindful of this risk, experiential teaching should also
173. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 11, at 735–36.
174. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 18, at 30 (“Law schools can support curricular integration of R
professional responsibility through course development stipends, research assistance, release time,
and faculty workshops. Legal ethics topics can be included in orientation programs, writing as-
signments, skills exercises, moot court competitions, and trial advocacy projects. Coverage can be
monitored by reports to the dean and questions on student evaluations.”).
175. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 87–125; CLEA REPORT, supra note 2.
176. See, e.g., Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; supra Part II.A.4. One of clinical education’s
significant contributions to legal education has been its emphasis on client-centered advocacy,
meaning paying attention to clients and their actual needs, guarding against lawyers’ tendencies to
treat their clients as cardboard persons and impute to them generic objectives, and making actual
client interests and goals the centerpiece of the attorney-client relationship. Kruse, supra note 89,
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include either an emphasis on, or an openness toward, relational perspec-
tives that considers the interests of both clients and lawyers as full human
beings grounded in webs of relationships.177
d. Mentorship as a Key Component of Legal Education
As Weresh explains, professional identity is formed and forged in the
context of memberships in relevant professional communities.178 Accord-
ingly, mentorships are relationships that are central to developing profes-
sional identity. In particular, law schools should provide mentoring through
faculty and through practicing lawyers.
Law professors should mentor students in multiple ways. Law profes-
sors should, as some already do, informally mentor students by taking them
to lunch or coffee in small groups on a regular basis, creating an arena in
which the professor and the students could engage in dialogue regarding
professional identity.179 Law professors could more formally mentor indi-
vidual students and serve as advisors for student associations.
Equally important, though, is mentoring by practitioners. Unlike
faculty, they are members of the professional community, which the stu-
dents will likely join upon graduation.  Practitioner mentorships “provide
students with an experiential window through which to view the profes-
sional world and exposure to the diverse spectrum of work that lawyers and
judges do” and “create opportunities for students to engage in conversations
with mentors, full- and part-time faculty, and peers about professionalism,
the practice of law, and what they are observing and learning through their
mentor experience.”180 A model mentoring program is that of St. Thomas
Law School, which requires each student to develop a “Personal and Pro-
fessional Development Plan,” including creating “a personal ethic mission,”
“identify[ing] a minimum of two lawyer or judicial experiences he or she
would like to do or see during the year with the mentor[,]” and “outlin[ing]
two or more agreed upon ‘topics’ . . . to discuss . . . during the year.”181
at 127. Defined in this way, client-centered advocacy, in contrast to lawyer-centric paternalistic
representation, continues to be an inherently important emphasis of legal education. Id. But teach-
ing client-centered advocacy, both in clinics and in doctrinal settings, comes with a dangerous
price tag, the possibility that professors will teach and students will understand client-centered
advocacy to mean elevating autonomous self-interested client objectives to the core of the attor-
ney-client relationship to the exclusion of considering their impact on opposing parties, third par-
ties, society, and the public interest.  Pearce & Wald, supra note 17; Pearce & Wald, supra note R
39, at 5.
177. See Kruse, supra note 89, at 127–28; Cantrell, supra note 90.
178. Weresh, supra note 45, at 346–57. See also Hamilton & Brabbit, supra note 111.
179. Such topics include why a student decided to go to law school, how she finds the experi-
ence to date, and what are her plans and interests for the future as a lawyer. The professor could
also share with the students information about her experiences and choices as a former law stu-
dent, practitioner, and law professor.
180. Hamilton & Brabbit, supra note 111, at 123.
181. Id. at 122–23.
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e. Grading for Competence, Not Competition
Curved grading has no correlation with competence. It serves only to
promote competition and a culture of autonomous self-interest.182 A curved
grade tells both the student and potential employers very little about the
student’s ability—it only describes how the student’s ability compares to
that of her peers. Even then, if students in a particular class have raw scores
that are relatively close to each other, curved grades will actually distort the
difference in ability between the students. Competence grades, on the other
hand, present faculty with a challenge. They will have to identify
benchmarks for achievement and then grade students based on whether they
meet those benchmarks. As with teaching in other fields, the ultimate goal
should be for each student to obtain mastery of the doctrine and skills
taught.
3. Modeling Community Leadership
Law schools and their faculty should model community leadership.
Law schools can take steps to become hubs of professional relationships.
Law schools should foster and demonstrate to their students commitment to
the community (local, regional, and national) by requiring or encouraging
its faculty to perform pro bono services broadly construed,183 regularly of-
fering continuing legal education sessions hosted by the law school, system-
atically inviting alumni to visit the school and meet the students, and by
proactively getting involved in issues that matter to the community.184
182. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
183. Consider David Luban’s compelling argument in favor of an achievable aspiration of
faculty pro bono. Luban’s thesis proceeds in two parts: first, Luban establishes that lawyers have a
pro bono obligation based on their role as indispensible trustees administering the actual distribu-
tion of and access to the law.  Luban, supra note 135, at 61–66; see also Rhode, supra note 18, at R
30–36 (“[I]f law schools’ primary goal is to create a culture of commitment to public service, then
exempting faculty role models is counterproductive.”). Second, Luban argues that while many law
professors see themselves as scholars, not lawyers, their relevant peer group is the practicing bar,
not university colleagues. Specifically, because law professors reap significant rewards from the
private practice of law and are part and parcel of the same “law economy,” they bear the same pro
bono responsibilities as lawyers. Luban, supra note 135, at 67–68.
184. A commitment to re-envision and reposition law schools as an important locus of profes-
sional activity, drawing practitioners and serving as an arena of law reform is, to be clear, inde-
pendent of any particular political or jurisprudential commitments of individual faculty members.
Historically, law schools outreaching to the community, in the form of establishing clinics and
offering legal assistance to under-privileged constituencies, has been associated with a liberal or
left-leaning political agenda. From a pedagogical perspective this has been regrettable: the associ-
ation helped cement a simplified and misleading dichotomy between the so-called “good”/public
interest oriented and “sellout”/private client inclined students; and may have discouraged some
conservative students from applying and participating in clinics, lending some prima facie credi-
bility to dichotomy. While such simplistic dichotomies are also common in law practice, South-
worth, supra note 131; Cummings & Rhode, supra note 131, law schools should stay clear in both
substance and perception of simplistic affiliations, especially those that tend to be correlated with
the very private/public divide which relational approaches attempt to challenge.
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4. Faculty Leadership
Fundamentally, we conceive of the law professor’s role as a relational
one, vis-a`-vis students, colleagues, the law school community, and the
greater community.185 With regard to students in particular, Brent Evan
Newton offers the helpful analogy of law faculty as fiduciaries of the stu-
dents.186 While we recognize the inherently important contribution of schol-
arship,187 we also expect law professors to invest meaningfully in their
teaching and in public service, and as discussed above, their mentoring.
Teaching should include collaborating with colleagues (co-teaching), en-
couraging collaboration and problem solving in classes, teaching more and
smaller classes, and reflecting an institutional and professional expectation
of incorporating experimental teaching. Service should include significantly
increased commitment to pursuing professional relationships with students
and alumni as mentors, acting as continuing legal education instructors and
Pro Bono consultants, as well as reaching out to the greater community,
showcasing a commitment to becoming civics and professionalism teachers
to both law students and the practicing bar and active agents of professional
socialization as members of the law school community.188
But, as noted above, the incentives for faculty favor autonomous self-
interest, and do not offer equal reward for relational self-interest. To pro-
mote relational self-interest, the incentive structure needs to change to ac-
cord value to teaching, service, and mentoring that is equivalent to that
currently accorded to scholarship.189 This equivalence in acknowledgement
and rewards should extend to salary and public recognition, as well as hir-
ing and promotion.190
5. Plausibility
In this article, we outline several reform proposals, some of which,
such as overhauling the curriculum and re-envisioning the role of law
professors, are likely to be perceived as fairly radical. While not alone in
185. See Hamilton & Brabbit, supra note 111, at 122–28 (describing the St. Thomas mentor-
ing program that connects law students to alumni and judges).
186. Newton, supra note 1.
187. See Brad Wendel, Law Schools Have a Research Mission Too, LEGAL ETHICS F. (Feb. 7,
2012), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2012/02/law-schools-have-a-research-mission-too.
html (offering a contextual and powerful defense of the inherent place and role of scholarship
within law schools).
188. See Weresh, supra note 45, at 353–56.
189. This may be easier said than done: as Lauren Carasik notes, a revised incentive scheme
that rewards teachers and law professors committed to serving their students may be a tough sell
to law schools competing for a U.S. News ranking given the emphasis in the ranking system on
perceived scholarly productivity. Carasik, supra note 1, at 808 n.379. R
190. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1.
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making such sweeping suggestions,191 we offer partial responses to those
who may be skeptical.
First, notwithstanding our interest in the details of future reforms, we
call attention to the big picture of legal education. Our main goal is to chal-
lenge its dominant, although largely implicit, culture. We argue that law
schools have been actively engaged in the formation of students’ profes-
sional identity and that they have been instilling a very particular, limited,
and undesirable professional identity in their students—autonomous self-
interest. We believe that law schools must be transparent about the project
of formation of professional identity in which they are engaged, and that
they must inform and educate students about alternatives to the dominant
professional paradigm. Specifically, law schools must introduce and ex-
plore relationally self-interested approaches to professionalism. As should
be evident, we view our specific proposals for integrating relational self-
interest as an invitation to dialogue rather than a finished agenda.192
Second, relational arguments for reform of legal education offer a
more persuasive rationale than that employed by the MacCrate,193 Car-
negie194 and CLEA195 reports. Even though they seek changes that would
shift legal education in a more relational direction, including a greater em-
phasis on skills training and formation of professional identity, they do not
confront the culture of autonomous self-interest at the core of contemporary
legal education, and they do not explain why professional values and train-
ing require a commitment to relational self-interest.196 Their failure to iden-
tify and challenge autonomous self-interest culture has undermined their
capacity to generate meaningful change to legal education.
Indeed, situating the Carnegie and CLEA reports in the context of rela-
tional approaches may provide them with additional compelling grounds
and may assist them in successfully reforming legal education. Arguments
based solely in the value of experience or on the importance of professional
commitments will find minimal traction with faculty and students who see
the world through the lens of autonomous self-interest. Relational self-inter-
est, in contrast, offers a vocabulary of self-interest that is a conversation
starter—as opposed to the rhetoric of professionalism that assumes that
lawyers are altruistic, which tends to serve as a conversation stopper.
191. See Rhode, supra note 18, at 36–37 (calling for diversity in educational and licensing R
structures).
192. For an alternative detailed reform proposal of legal education, see Newton, supra note 1,
at 26–45 (advocating for reform of law schools’ curriculum); id. at 45–63 (calling for a re-concep-
tualization of law professors’ role).
193.  MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 2.
194. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2.
195. CLEA REPORT, supra note 2.
196. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate’s Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s
Failure to Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L. REV. 575 (2004).
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Moreover, the focus of legal education—the practice of law—is itself
largely a relational exercise.197 Because students and faculty understand—
at least to some significant extent—that their lives have significant rela-
tional components, they will understand that lawyers’ work does as well.
They are therefore more likely to be open to arguments made from rela-
tional perspectives, rather than those made from an abstract commitment to
either experiential teaching or professional values. In addition, given that
law students, faculty, and staff do experience life relationally, they will find
relational approaches more fulfilling if they are adopted in the long run.
Both the fulfillment that derives from relational approaches and the neces-
sity of incorporating a relational perspective into excellent law teaching,
weigh strongly in favor of a program of education grounded in relational
self-interest.
Last, one should not underestimate the capacity of law schools to im-
plement changes and pursue commitments that are contrary to the dominant
culture of autonomous self-interest. While the task is going to be challeng-
ing, law schools should lead the way in reenergizing and reinventing rela-
tional approaches in the practice of law.198 What better legal institutions
than law schools to stand behind desirable good ideas and pursue them?
Indeed, law schools have proven the ability to do so before.
Law schools’ commitment to affirmative action and diversity in the
name of enhancing access to the legal profession is a prime example of their
openness and commitment to relational agendas.199 To be clear, pursuing
diversity in their admission policies was and continues to be in the best
interest of law schools and their students. But that is exactly the point about
relational self-interest. It does not deny the self-interest aspect of individu-
als and entities. Pursuing diversity is in the best and self-interest of law
schools. Affirmative action in admission policies, importantly, is also in the
best and self-interest of other constituencies: the legal profession, minorities
previously excluded from membership in the profession, and American so-
ciety at large.200 And law schools have demonstrated a commitment to their
admission policies, to the pursuit of diversity, and to the advancement of
relational goals in the face of significant challenges.201 There is hope, there-
fore, that other relational commitments may take hold.
197. See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 48.
198. Some commentators are calling for this very kind of reform. For example, Judith Maute
has recently argued that “[w]e have duties of stewardship, to spend wisely and produce well-
trained, competent lawyers committed to return value to the community.” Judith Maute, Law
School Responsibilities, Higher Yet for Public Schools, LEGAL ETHICS F. (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2012/02/law-school-responsibilities-higher-yet-for-public-
schools.html.
199. See Rhode, supra note 18, at 40. R
200. Wald, supra note 31, at 1080–81.
201. See Eli Wald, The Visibility of Socioeconomic Status and Class-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion: A Reply to Professor Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 861 (2011) (discussing the racial, socio-
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CONCLUSION
“There is so much wrong with legal education today,” writes Morrison
Torrey, “that it is hard to know where to begin.”202 We believe that propo-
nents of reform must start by recognizing the influence and dominance of
the culture of autonomous self-interest in legal education and the role it
plays in informing and shaping what law schools do. Next, the hegemony of
autonomous self-interest must be challenged and relational approaches have
to be advanced and promoted to allow law students, lawyers, and law
professors room to develop and practice richer conceptions of professional-
ism and professional identity. People tend to be cooperative and relational,
naturally and intuitively understanding their own self-interest as related to
and depending on the self-interest of others.203 Lawyers employing rela-
tional approaches in representing clients and in acting as public citizens and
as civic teachers can more effectively serve both private and public inter-
ests.204 Law schools and law professors, in particular, have a responsibility
to advance relational self-interest as a meaningful alternative to autonomous
self-interest, if only to allow their students to more actively choose and
participate on an informed basis in the development of their own concep-
tions of professional identity.
economic, and ethnic diversity of law schools, and how institutional policy has affected
admissions for minority students).
202. Morrison Torrey, You Call That Education?, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 93 (2004); see
also Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 479, 481–83 (2009).
203. See Pearce & Wald, supra note 17, at 17–18.
204. See id.
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APPENDIX
A relational first-year curriculum could include the following:
Fall Spring
Contracts/Torts Contracts/Torts
Criminal/Property Law Criminal/Property Law
Professional Responsibility Administrative/Constitutional Law
Legislative Interpretation205 The Professions206
Legal Research and Writing Skills Training
The second year curriculum would reflect the same commitments:
Fall Spring
Core (Corporations, Constitutional Core (Corporations, Constitutional
Law, Family Law, Trusts and Law, Family Law, Trusts and
Estates, Evidence, etc.)207 Estates, Evidence, etc.)
Jurisprudence208 Interdisciplinary Analysis209
The Law Governing Lawyers /The Legal Profession210 Legal Ethics211
International Law Comparative Law
Lawyering Skills Lawyering Skills Advanced(communications, interviewing, (litigation, transactional, etc.)depositions, etc.)212
205. See, e.g., The New 1L Curriculum, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/
careers/ocs/employers/about-our-students/the-new-1l-curriculum.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
206. A course on comparative professionalism (e.g., medicine).
207. Core denotes a grouping of classes covering subject matters commonly tested on the bar
exam.
208. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 88; THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
(David Kennedy & William W. Fisher eds., 2006).
209. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 88, at 164–67 (on the importance and use of “law and”
classes for legal education).
210. A course on the structure, organization, and ideology of the legal profession, including
empirical and theoretical findings.
211. A course on the law governing lawyers, akin to the currently required legal ethics course.
212. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 2, at 87–126. R
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And the third year would include:
Fall Spring
Elective Elective
Elective Elective
Elective Elective
Seminar / Writing213 Clinical Education214
Practicing Law in the Public Practicing Law in the Public
Spirit: Mandatory Pro Bono / Spirit: Justice and Professional
Externships215 Values216
213. See, e.g., id. at 104–11 (on the importance of upper writing requirements).
214. See, e.g., id. at 7–12 (on clinical education).
215. See ABA Standing Comm. on Pro Bono and Pub. Service, Chart of Law School Pro
Bono Programs, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (June 24, 2011), http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb_programs_chart.html. But see Robert Granfield,
Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono
Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355, 1404–05 (2007) (“[I]n mandatory [pro bono] programs, the
emphasis on skills training may usurp the question of professional commitment to serving
underrepresented populations. . . . One potential drawback of mandatory pro bono programs and
their tendency to focus on skill-based benefits might be that they unintentionally dilute the
meaning and purpose of pro bono.”).
216. See supra notes 84–87, 162–164 and accompanying text.
